Introduction
THERE are many people who would be glad to pay (on the quiet) large sums of money in order to be knighted. There are persons who would happily give up by the Nobel Prize money and even pay some in order to get the Nobel Prize. However, if the ones responsible for giving these awards and honours frequently sold them to the highest bidders, the awards would become devalued. Some government awards which invariably go to 'loyalists' (that is, people who 'pay' the government with their loyalty), instead of the most deserving, get so devalued that even the loyalists are not flattered when they get them.
This shows that the value to an individual of an award or a prize does not depend on merely its inherent value-for example, the gold in an olympic medal, the money in a prize packet or whatever it is that is used to confer a knighthood. It depends on the allocation rule itself which is used to decide who will receive the awards. If the awards are allocated by a rule which picks the 'best' or most talented, they would have a certain value to the recipients. If they are allocated via the price mechanism (that is, they are given to whomever is willing to pay most) they would have another value.
The present paper looks at a special class of such goods and services. It is a study of commodities (the word 'commodities' being used generally enough to include services, memberships, awards and, of course, commodities), the utility from which depends on who its other recipients (or consumers) are. By acquiring such a commodity a person tries to gain association, in the eyes of fellow human beings, with its other recipients.1
The example of people seeking association are many. Much of Veblen's (1899) classic work on the leisure class is on this subject. Sociologists even have a name for the process by which members of lesser castes emulate the customs and rites of the Brahminic groups in order to impress upon fellow human beings their improving station in life. They call it Sanskritization2
For helpful suggestions I thank Tariq Banuri, Don Patinkin, Nirvikar Singh and, especially, and as a concept we find its counterparts in most societies-backward and advanced. As an essay in the New York Times,3 entitled 'The Art of Selling to the Very Rich', notes, "Nobody buys one of Gerry Grinberg's watches to get unbearably accurate time. Mr. Grinberg admits it. You can get as good time on an $18 watch." As for the reason why they buy such watches, the essay quotes Mr. Grinberg: "People want to show their station in life." People also often try to signal their status by pretending to have certain preferences. Thus among the members of upwardly mobile classes a larger number eat in ethnic restaurants than enjoy eating ethnic food; a larger number profess to enjoying art than actually do.4
The subject of association goods is not new in the sense that it lies at the cross-section of many earlier themes: positional goods,5 snob effects,6 the theory of clubs7 and status goods.8 Nevertheless, the nature of the equilibrium that arises in the presence of such goods is ill-understood. This paper illustrates the role of association goods in understanding several real-life phenomena, especially the existence of excess-demand and excesssupply equilibria, through a series of simple models.
Clubs
A classic association good is the membership of clubs and societies which restrict admission to social elites and distinguished persons. Such clubs may have some facilities, like swimming pools and libraries, but the real reason why people toil to become members is that there is status associated with being admitted.9"' I shall develop a very simple model mainly to illustrate how association goods may exhibit equilibria with excess demand. I consider a club which is run by a profit-maximising entrepreneur. Before going into a generalised 3Written by N. R. Kleinfield in the New York Times, Business section, of 15 June 1986. 4And here is Veblen on the reason for some people's demand for alcohol and stimulants (p. 70): "Drunkenness and the other pathological consequences of the free use of stimulants therefore tend in their turn to become honorific, as being a mark, at the second remove, of the superior status of those who are able to afford the indulgence."
This influential concept was developed by Hirsch (1977) , though he did not pursue its implications for market equilibria far enough. Similar ideas, albeit in more diluted form, can be traced further back in time to, in particular, Wicksteed (1910) . A recent revival of this approach occurs in Frank (1985a) ; see also Frank (1985b) .
6The best-known work on this being that of Leibenstein (1950) .
7This is discussed in Section 1 below. 8In Basu (1987a) I model the case where individuals value a good more if others seek but fail to acquire it. This could be for reasons of quality uncertainty or social status. Related ideas occur in Scitovsky (1944) and Leruth (1987) .
9There may be reasons, quite unconnected with status, why people want to belong to certain clubs or communities. This could be because a sense of belonging is often an end in itself (this is discussed by Hirschman, 1985) or it is the basis of "well-being" (Rainwater, (1974) . However, to the extent that people have preferences over belonging to different groups, the formal structure of my model would remain applicable.
'0There is a large and interesting literature on clubs, beginning with Buchanan's (1965) investigation (see, for example, Ng, (1973) ; Sandler and Tschirhart (1980) ). But clubs which people join for reasons of association, to wit, the kind of clubs I am discussing here, have an extremely brief literature (see McGuire, 1972 ) but widespread existence in reality. the higher charge that they are willing to pay (perhaps even replace some type 1 people with type 2) and the club's profit will rise. This, however, need not be so. Since the club membership is an association good, the act of admitting more type 2 people may change the status rating of the club and make everybody willing to pay less membership fee. Thus excess demand may exist in equilibrium with profit-maximising agents. Any attempt on the part of the club to eliminate the excess demand by taking in more members or changing the composition of members may change the character of the club, make people less eager to join it and thus lower the club's profits. It should be clear that since my purpose is to explain excess-demand, my job would be easier if the club's objective was something other than profits.
Thus my assumption that clubs are run by entrepreneurs who maximise profits is not made in the belief that this is so in reality, but simply to choose an assumption which is adverse from my point of view. With this, let us proceed to a formal analysis.
Let H be the set of all people and, for all i in H, let H(i) be the set of all subsets of H which have i as an element. For all i in H, let vi be a real-valued mapping on H(i) such that for all M E H(i), vi(M) is the maximum amount that i would be willing to pay to be a member of a club in which M is the set of members." I shall, to start with, assume that the club cannot charge discriminatory fees from its members, and that admitting additional members does not entail any costs on the part of the club entrepreneur. Hence, a club with a set M of members earns a profit of (#M) miniEM vi(M), where #M deno the number of elements in M. The club's aim is to choose a subset M of H which maximises profit. More formally, its aim is to:
Let M* be a solution of (1). M* may be described as an equilibrium set of It is easy to show that there may be an excess demand for membership in equilibrium. We shall here say that there is an excess demand for membership if there exists a person j who does not belong to M * and vj(M* U {j}) > v*. In this case j is a person who is willing to pay more the membership fee to join the club but the club will not admit him.
The possibility of an excess-demand equilibrium may be illustrated with an example. Let H = {1, 2, 3}, and suppose
We could think of individuals 2 and 3 as men of status (the old nobility).
Person 1 would pay a lot to join a club which has 2 or 3 as member. While 1 (the nouveau riche) can pay a lot, he is not quite the coveted person. In fact his being in a club, devalues its membership altogether for 2 and 3.
In the above example, the equilibrium club is one which has 2 and 3 as members and charges a fee of 2. Person 1 is denied membership even though he is willing to pay 3 units, which is more than the membership fee. This is a case of excess-demand equilibrium.
Several existing models of excess-demand or excess supply equilibria make use of the assumption of non-discriminatory prices, for example, the assumption that a firm cannot pay different wages to its workers. In the above model I also use a similar assumption since it was supposed that all members have to be charged the same fee. However, the excess demand result is more robust here in that it would survive a relaxation of the non-discrimination assumption. 12
Let us consider now a club which is allowed to charge discriminatory fees.
Its aim is to choose M (subset of H) so as to maximise profit. Profit is now given by the aggregate of the maximum that each member is willing to pay.
In this case there can be different ways of defining excess demand.
Consider the following definition which is the most adverse from my point of view: We shall say that excess demand exists if there is a person j who is not admitted to the club but who is willing to pay more than the highest-paying club member. That there can be excess demand in this sense in a case where a club can charge differential fees is obvious from the above numerical example. Person 1 would still be kept out even though he would be willing to pay a larger fee than is being paid by either of the two existing members.
Drawing on our knowledge of social psychology, it may be possible to place restrictions on the vi-functions. For instance, if we wish to characterize a society where wealth or ability to pay is the only thing which gives 12What constitutes 'no-discrimination' can have several formal interpretations (Ba but here I take the simple meaning of 'same fees from all'. 
There may be other ways of formalising this. It may be interesting to pursue the consequences of different restrictions on vi-functions. We could also try to isolate conditions under which there is no excess-demand in equilibrium or under which the equilibrium is unique.13
Finally, it may appear that the club's ability to discriminate in its choice of members is crucial for the existence of excess-demand equilibria. This is, however, not so. Let us assume that a club is required to be nondiscriminatory in its selection of members in the sense that its proportions of different types of members must match the proportions of different types of people who want to be members.14 Even in this case it is possible to construct examples to show that there can be excess demand in equilibrium.
But instead of dwelling on this I turn presently to the labour market where some related problems can arise.
Jobs
While people work for money, they also work for the 'recognition' that employment confers. As Sen (1975a, p. 5) observes, "Employment can be a factor in self-esteem and indeed in esteem by others". Taking a cue from this and using a more elaborate version of this basic idea, we could argue that not only do certain kinds of employment give recognition, the amount of recognition may vary with the nature of the employing firm or the job.'5
And, one index of the quality of a firm is the quality of the people employed by it. An important reason why a prestigious university is considered prestigious is the status of its faculty members. Similarly a firm could be prestigious because it employs MBAs of top management schools and the children of the nobility. Now, if i joins such a firm, most people would associate i with the other employees of the firm. Given that individuals do 13Another useful direction of enquiry concerns the objective function of clubs and the determination of who the decision-maker is. In Buchanan's (1965) model of clubs all individuals are identical and so a representative individual's attempt to maximise utility is what determines club size. With heterogeneous agents the problem is more serious. There can be models where there are fairly well-defined existing members who are the collective decisionmakers. This is the assumption in Walzer's (1983) construction, which deals with a broader notion of membership and goes into questions of not only clubs but immigration. There is an interesting theoretical question even here concerning dynamics. Suppose that at each stage the existing members decide on who will be the next batch of new entrants. Then, to the extent that the new entrants will have a say in future rounds about future entrants, the current incumbents will take into account the preferences of the outsiders in doing their calculus of deciding whom to admit.
141 use this non-stochastic definition for simplicity. For a discussion of a criterion which allows for random errors and is a generalization of my definition, see Ashenfelter and Oaxaco (1987) and, in particular, their discussion of the interesting court case of Castaneda v. Partida.
15This is implied by Sen's (1975b) observation ".... people may in fact prefer to receive income for work rather than be on the dole", because being on the dole could, in the abstract, be thought of as a certain 'job'.
seek this kind of recognition, it is reasonable to expect that an individual would be willing to work for a distinguished firm for a lower salary than what he would demand from a run-of-the-mill employer.16
In order to formally analyse the consequence of association effects, consider a 'firm' (this being the generic name for any employer, including universities) employing professional labourers, for example, managers or academics. Assume that there are two kinds of potential employees: (i) those who hold management degrees and are referred to here as prestige workers (type p) and (ii) the rest, who may be called ordinary workers (type o). In this model a worker's type is given exogenously. It is for reasons of simplicity that I desist from modelling the acquisition of prestige as a part of the theory. All workers are equally productive. That is, the output, X, produced by the firm depends on the total amount of labour employed by it.
If ni is the number of labourers of type i employed by the firm, then X=X(np +no), X' >0, X"<O (2) The association or status effect is introduced through the assumption that the reservation wages, wp and wo (that is, the minimum wages at which Assuming that wages are specified in real terms and that all workers of the same type have to be paid the same wage, the firm's profit, R. is given "6For some indirectly corroborative evidence, see Jencks, Perman and Rainwater (1988) and, especially, their reference to Siegel's findings.
17 This should make it clear that my p and o are not euphemisms for w and b. In models of racial discrimination each group prefers to cluster with its own types (Becker, (1957) ; Schelling, (1972) ). In addition, it is often assumed that employers prefer to employ labourers of their own race. While Akerlof's (1976 Akerlof's ( , 1980 model is very different from this it is also very distinct from my model of status. In Akerlof, people have no a priori associative preference one way or the other. They have conjectures about interpersonal preferences. Though these conjectures have no exogenous basis, they are corroborated in equilibrium. Finally, it is worth clarifying that preferences are being taken as given and I am not concerned with the effects of discrimination on preferences. The firm's aim is to maximise R(np, no) by choosing (np, no) . Denoting the solution of this by (n*, n*) (these may be referred to as equilibrium values) and assuming that it occurs in the interior, the first-order conditions may be written as:
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It is easy to check that (5) and (7) imply wo(q *, no ) < X'(n * + n*) (8) where q* = n*/(n* + n*).
This may, at first sight, look like a well-known consequence of the fact that the firm acts like a monopsonist in the labour market (which renders wage to be less than the marginal product of labour). What is interesting and easy to check is that even if, unlike a monopsonist, the firm is unable to vary wo by varying no, that is, Swo/ no = 0, (8) would be true. (8) here is a consequence of the association effect.
What about the wage earned by type-p labourers? In general we cannot limit this. But as we approach the competitive case we get the proposition that not only does the wage earned by type-p workers exceed the wage of the type-o but it exceeds the marginal product of labour. There are several conditions under which this happens. I state and discuss only one here.
Observe that in the determination of wp (see (3)), np operates via two routes: (1) It affects q, which in turn affects wp. (2) It affects wp directly. (1) and (2) Since the right-hand side of (9) represents the association effect and the left-side, i.e., Swp/Snp, goes to zero as the labour market becomes competitive (that is, this firm is one among many hiring labour), we shall say that the association effect is strong or the labour market is nearcompetitive if and only if (9) is true.
X' (n + n*) < wp(q*, n* ) (10)
What we have established thus far may be summed up in:
Theorem 1. The wage earned by type-o workers is always less than the marginal product of labour. The wage earned by type-workers exceeds the marginal product of labour if the association effect is strong or the labour market is near-competitive.
It is claimed by many people that the holders of management degrees from well-known institutions are not as productive as their salaries suggest. The above model shows that this may indeed be so.
The above model also explains involuntary unemployment because the firm employs some prestige workers at w (q*, n*), even though there may be an excess supply of ordinary workers (who are of course as productive as type-workers) offering to work for a smaller wage than this.
Let us now consider a law prohibiting discrimination in wages among labourers of equal productivity which means both types of labourers have to be paid the same wage. In the present model this could have quite unexpected and even adverse affects. Though such a law is a well-meaning intervention it could have consequences which are undesirable. The next theorem and the discussion that follows capture this phenomenon. (5) and (9) The counterpart of Theorem 2 in the case of many firms is interesting. It asserts that if intra-firm wage discrimination is prohibited, then the labour market will get completely segregated in the sense that each firm will employ only one type of labour.
While I have stated the above non-discrimination provision in terms of the law, it is entirely possible that custom or a system of social sanctions compels a firm to refrain from what society views as discrimination and, in particular, prevent the firm from paying different wages to types o and p.
The persistence of such customs can be explained endogenously, though their roots may lie in distant history (Basu, Jones and Schlicht, (1987) ; see also Akerlof, (1976); Basu, (1986) ). This is what renders simplistic debates on the pros and cons of intervention misleading. What a government intervention achieves may in some societies be achieved through a multitude of rational acts on the parts of individuals.
Finally, a comment on education. In the signalling model (Arrow, (1973) ; Spence (1973) ), education does not necessarily enhance productivity; but through the working of the general equilibrium, the more educated people turn out to be the more productive (because they are the ones who find it profitable to acquire education) and they command a higher wage. In the present model if we interpret type-workers as the educated workers, then we find that the link between education and productivity is even weaker than in the signalling model, because everybody's productivity is the same. Nevertheless, in our model there is a positive relation between education and wage, as in the signalling model.
And, indeed, it should be possible to have productivity depend on education and to model association effects as an additional feature.
Schools
Should schools be allowed to charge students discriminatory fees? In India many schools and institutes (especially engineering and medical) have often charged special frees from some students. 'Capitation fees', as these are usually called, have led to much criticism and, wherever possible, legislation preventing discriminatory fees. The implicit argument has been that this would lead schools to admit only richer students who are able to pay more. This argument ceases to be valid once we recognise that association effects are usually strong in the domain of schooling. In the presence of association effects one can find parametric situations where discriminatory fees may be not just efficient, but ethically desirable.
The intuitive idea is this. Suppose that there are four kinds of potential students: clever and rich (cr), clever and poor (cp), mediocre and rich (mr), and mediocre and poor (mp). The term 'clever' is used here simply to denote students who are able to absorb and make good use of education.
The ethical concern here is a limited one: we want to have a system in which cp students are not denied education. What I want to argue is that in the presence of association effects (i) there is no reason why allowing discriminatory fees will necessarily lead to cp students being denied admission and (ii) there are situations where permitting discriminatory fees may in fact mean more cp students will be admitted.
The argument is based on the assumption that school-labels help. A student from a college where the average student is brilliant stands a better chance of getting a good job than if the same student had been to an ordinary college. This is because firms and other employers use school labels as indices of quality. It is often too expensive to test each prospective employee and one uses ones knowledge of a school's general standing to judge its alumni.'8 Now suppose an entrepreneur (a profit-maximiser) is setting up a school.
If he is allowed to charge any and variable fees would he admit only the rich at high fees? The answer is "no" because he will realise that the school's reputation and consequently the fees that the rich are willing to pay depend largely on the average quality of his students. Thus he will always have an eye on taking on good students, if necessary for no fees, because that will enable him to charge a higher fee from the rich. Having a law ensuring non-discriminatory fees may lead him to abandon those who cannot pay altogether.
I construct here a very simple model to illustrate these propositions.
Consider a society in which there are ncr clever and rich (potential) st Likewise for nicP and fimr. It is assumed that there are no mediocre a students (i.e. rimp = 0). This is because this category plays no role in the present model excepting for the wholly negative one of complicating the algebra.
Consider now a school in which ncr is the number of clever and rich students and likewise for nCP and nmr (recall that nmp has to be zero). Th school's reputation depends on what fraction of its students are clever, that '8There is an interesting analogy here with 'honarary degrees'. For these there are two types of recipients-those who are 'deserving' and those who have given a lot of money to the school. If the 'purchasers' are to consider this an honour, it is necessary that enough deserving types get the award. I am grateful to a referee for this example. The rich students are willing to pay school fees up to s(q). That is, they would like to join the school as long as the acquisition of education yields a non-negative net life-time income. The poor are not able to pay this much.
For simplicity, we assume that they are willing and able to pay a fraction, 0(0 < 0 < 1) of s(q), that is, up to Os(q). This is easily justified. If we assume that the poor have to borrow money at an interest of r to pay their school fees, then we get exactly the above kind of behaviour with 0 = 1/(1 + r). In this sense it is being assumed that the rich have access to money at zero interest rate. All our results would be intact if we assume simply that the rich have access to 'cheaper' money than the poor.
It is supposed that educating students does not entail any cost on the part of the school. There is however a maximum number of seats, #1, in the school, so that it cannot admit more students than fj. In order to sharpen the conflict between the clever-and-poor and the mediocre-and-rich, we assume fcr<n; fcr +cp f cr +mr:- (13) The school's aim is to maximise profit by deciding on how many students of each category to admit. I shall consider two alternative policy regimes:
The school can charge any student any fee.
Case 2
The government prohibits discriminatory fees.
I later comment on a third case in which the government actually fixes the school fee or sets an upper bound to it.
In case 1, the profit function is Ii(ncry nmry np) = ncrs(q) + nmrs(q) + ncpOs(q) (14) It is quite obvious that before taking students of any other category, the school will admit all cr-students. Since ir < ii, it follows that the profit function may be simply written as [Ii(nmr np) -= fcrs(q) + nmrs(q) + n, Os(q). (15) In case 2, since the school cannot charge discriminatory fees it will have to charge all students the fee which the student who is willing to pay the least (among those admitted) is prepared to pay. Hence, the school's profit in case 2, denoted by [12 is given by (noting again that ncr will end up equal to ficr) 112(nmry n p) -Os(q)((cr + nmr + np), if ncp > 0 (16) (s(q) (fcr+ nmr),Y if n 0 (6 In both cases the firm's aim is to maximise profit subject to icr + n.
In proving the theorems it is useful to first establish a simple proposition concerning case 2:
Lemma 1: In case 2, either no cp-students will be admitted or no mr-students will be admitted.
Proof
Using stars to denote the firm's optimal choice, suppose n * > 0 and flmr> 0. Hence, the top line of equation (16) is relevant. If the school increases the number of cp-students a little and decreases mr-students by the same amount (by (13), it is possible to do this), then q would rise, and hence s(q) would rise. Since ficr + nmr + nep remains unchanged, the pr would rise by virtue of this adjustment. Hence the original situation could not have been optimal for the firm.
The proof of Lemma 1 may give the impression that it is never worthwhile admitting mr-students. This is wrong because there is a discontinuity in profit where ncp = 0 and it is easy to check that max [n2(nmr, 0) > lim max 1i2(nmr ncp).
nmir nzcp>O 1inr
The advantage of Lemma 1 is that the profit function (16) can now be written simply as [n2(nlr n,,) =fOs (1) (ficr + nc~ if ncp > 0 S {(q ) (icr+ nmr), if np= 0 It is quite obvious from the above that if the school decides to admit cp-students it is best to fill up all seats in the school, that is, admit n--ncr students of type cp. It follows that [12 can be written even more simply as n2(nmr) =max {s(l)nX max S -ficr + fcr) mr) (17) nm-h-,c cr +nmr ~ Theorem 3: In case 1 the seats in the school are always filled. In case 2 it is possible to have an equilibrium where seats are left vacant and students are denied admission. the s(q) function is that s'(q) : 0, clearly there can be an s(q) function such that nmr= argmax S ( y )(ficr + nmr) <fi -hcr (18) nmr ficr nmr
In such a case the school will admit nmr students of type mr, since that maximises (17). By (18), the total number of students admitted to the school, ner + n'mry is less than fi. By (13), there are more mr-studen society (i.e. nimr -hmr> 0) who would be willing to pay the school fees and be admitted to the school.
Theorem 3 shows that with association effects we could have in equilibrium what is usually found only in disequilibrium situations, namely, unutilized resources both on the supply and demand sides.
Theorem 4: There is a class of situations where a law requiring that all students be charged the same fees would result in the cp-students being refused admission; and the revocation of such a law would mean that cp-students would be admitted.
From Theorem 3 we know that in case 2 there are situations where some seats are left vacant; and from the proof of Theorem 3 we know that whenever this happens, only mr-students are admitted to the school (i.e., of course, after first admitting all cr-students). Consider such a situation. Since nmr < n -her 1 to leave vacant seats (see (19) and (20)). Starting from this situation if (in case 1) the school admits some cp students, HI, must rise since q will rise.
What we have established therefore is t nor + nCP f -n-ncr and Ili1(nmry nqp nmr (20) , means that the revocation of a law prohibiting discriminatory fees (i.e., a switch from case 2 to case 1) would result in cp-students being admitted.
One could utilize the framework of this section to analyse other questions, in particular, the consequence of (A) fixing the fees (i.e., the case where the government not only prohibits discriminatory fees but actually fixes the fee at some level).
(B) setting an upper limit on the fees (i.e., discriminatory fees are allowed but they must not exceed a certain level).
Instead of analysing these formally, I shall make some brief comments drawing on the intuition already established in this section. Also, I tend to focus on how (A) and (B) could have effects which are unexpected and the opposite of what usually motivates the enactment of such laws. It will indeed be a fallacy to treat the could as will.
The adverse effect of (A) on the poorest sections is obvious. In reality, unlike in our model, there are many levels of poverty. So no matter where the fees are fixed the poorest sections would be unable to pay for their education. In our model if, for instance, the fee is above Os(1), then none of the poor students (clever or mediocre) would be able join the school.
Indeed, (A) is unrealistic. No government would have such a policy, because presumably no government would prevent schools from giving scholarships and assistance to some chosen students. Now, a system of fixed fees with scholarships to some is effectively system (B), which sets an upper limit on students' fees. So let us turn to analysing the consequence of (B). This is best done in two stages. First consider (A) and then analyse the effect of a switch to (B).
Consider first a case where the school fee was fixed (by law) at a level, J, which is above sO(1). As just discussed, none of the poor will be admitted to school because they are unable to pay the school fees. Now suppose that the law is changed to type (B), with f being treated as an upper limit.
That is, the government now allows the school to lower the fees for some students if it so wishes. So now the school can, in principle, reach out to the poorer students who were earlier priced out of the market. The question is, will it? Consider the reason why the school may want to lower the fees for some students. This could only be in order to admit some clever-and-poor students which would improve the school's academic rating and thereby allow it (i) to charge higher fees from the rich students, or (ii), in case there were vacant seats in the original equilibrium, to admit more rich students at the ceiling fee. It is immediately obvious that in the case where the seats are full when only one fee is allowed, the option of lowering the fees will not be exercised if the school is not allowed to raise anyone's fee. The maximumfee law, by cutting off the school's option of raising the fees on the rich, cuts off its incentive to make concessions to students who are good but unable to pay their fees for reasons of poverty. There is now a considerable body of literature in economics on prizes (see, e.g., Lazear and Rosen, (1981) ; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, (1983); Rosen, (1986) ). In this literature a prize distinguishes itself from other systems of rewards, e.g., wages, by virtue of the fact that several people toil for it but one (or perhaps few) gets the award in the end on the basis of one's relative performance. The others get nothing for their toil. This leads to many interesting questions but those are not my concern here. What this literature does not consider is that a prize usually gives its recipient recognition. To that extent it belongs to the class of association goods, like club membership, jobs or schools. This immediately means, as is obvious from the models in the earlier sections, that the granting of prizes is a strategic variable in the hands of the prize-giver. The prize-giver can optimise his own profit, utility or whatever he is trying to maximise by suitably selecting the recipients and extracting payments in kind or as return-favours out of them. This objective may not always coincide with that of selecting the most deserving people. However, the prize-giver does have the incentive not to deviate too far from selecting deserving people because that may diminish the worth of the prize and once that happens he would no longer be able to 'sell' the prize, that is, exchange it for whatever his objective is.
From the above remarks it is clear that prizes can be modelled much like the theory of clubs in Section 2. If we think of the prize-giver as the club-entrepreneur and the group of prize-recipients as club members, the same kind of theorising becomes possible. There is one interesting additional feature here, though. Prize-giving is usually a periodic affair (olympic models once every four years, Nobel prizes once each year, etc.) which means time is a more pronounced element in the activity of prize-giving than in a theory of clubs. This introduces some special elements. For instance, if the prize-giver is myopic in the sense of having a high time discount, then in any particular year he may be more inclined to selling the award to the highest bidder than giving to the most-deserving. Of course, this means that the following year's highest bidder will be willing to pay less (because the prize is a little devalued) and the process continues till the prize is totally devalued. The same would have a greater tendency to occur if each year a new selection committee chooses the recipients of the prize.
The future value of the prize will be less in its interest than it would be in the case of a more permanent committee.
Sanskritization
Finally, a comment on Sanskritization which is one of the purest manifestations of association activity. This, as already briefly discussed above, refers to rituals, customs and behaviour which the castes or classes at the lower end of a society's accepted hierarchy adopt in order to signal to others their improving station in life.19
Sanskritization cannot be analysed in the same way as we have analysed clubs, jobs or schools, because an elite group or caste is not an entity whose membership is managed by an agent to achieve some objective. Nevertheless, it raises an interesting question in the light of our models. Clearly for the membership of some group to be an association good, that is, for others to want to join it, there must be costs involved in trying to join the group. If not, then outsiders would continue to rush in as long as there is value in joining the group. Its membership, in other words, would cease to be an association good in equilibrium.
The fact that Sanskritization exists at all raises the question as to what the costs of Sanskritization are. Though the 'elites' of a society form a nebulous collection and no one charges an entry fee for joining them, there must exist hidden charges; and, indeed, there are. In the context of caste societies, these take the form of ridicule if one attempts Sanskritization and fails.
Thus the cost is an expected cost but sure enough it is there. This is brought out very clearly in Srinivas's (1955) essay on a southern Indian village (p. Using the theories of association developed in this paper, it ought to be possible to formalise the concept of Sanskritization. Such a formalization in conjunction with Akerlof's model of customs could give us some insights into the dynamics of customs and mores.
Conclusions
Association goods complicate policy questions. It is well-known that a lot of corruption (e.g., bribery) germinates from the existence of goods and services which are not distributed through the price mechanism. To this a standard response has been to suggest that we simply turn these goods over to the price mechanism. This prescription runs into difficulty if the good in question happens to be an association good. In that case, as discussed in Section 1, the value of the good itself may depend on the mechanism used to allocate it and may be diminished by a resort to a particular mechanism.
I shall, however, put aside policy issues here and briefly comment instead on two important subjects which I have not taken up in this paper but which deserve analysis in future. These are general equilibrium and welfare. It would be valuable to construct a general equilibrium model where one commodity happens to be an association good. A simple way to model this 19Demonstration effects, international or within a society (Duesenberry, (1949); James, (1987) ) are manifestations of a similar phenomenon in the domain of consumption.
would be to suppose that there are h individuals and n goods and the nth good is an association good. Let x, be the number of units of good j consumed by person i. Let x-(X,. x1 x1 .x) Person i's utility function could be defined as follows: i = ui(X , xi x').
The utility function would have the usual restrictions plus the following one: if x' = 0, then changes in x-' cannot affect u'. The unusual variable in the utility function is xv'. But its presence is easy to understand. Since n is an association good, the value of consuming this good to an individual depends on who else is consuming this good, i.e. xn'. One could, of course, impose more restrictions than the one imposed above. For instance, we could define a priori a set of people, among the h, who have social status, and then require that if x' > 0, u' will go up if x ' changes such that the total amount of good consumed by those with social status increases.
If we assume now that each person has an initial endowment of each of the goods (as a special case, considering the possibility that one person owns the entire endowment of good n) we could conduct an analysis of some standard questions like whether an equilibrium exists and whether the equilibrium will be Pareto-optimal.
The existence and the welfare question gets much harder conceptually, if
we allow for the possibility that for an association good there need not be an initial endowment in the same way that endowments are assumed to exist for goods in standard economic theory. This is because association goods can, in reality, often be created. For instance, giving people certificates or giving them honorary titles are acts which, in principle, any agent can undertake and with virtually no resource being used. It is difficult to think of a technological or resource-based upper bound on the number of certificates that can be given in an economy. It is necessary to think of the bounds on certificates, honours and awards in very different terms from the bounds on guns, butter or even hair-cuts.
These are some of the open problems which the present paper brings to light' These problems are likely to be interesting but also conceptually difficult. Sufficiently so, to call this present essay to a close.
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